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Abstract
Despite the intense debate on the advantages  and  The survey revealed  that the group of integrated
disadvantages of adopting integrated  supervision that has  supervisory agencies  is not as homogeneous as it seems.
taken place in recent years,  little is known about the  Important differences arise with  regard to the scope of
experiences of countries that have adopted  it and the  regulatory and supervisory powers the agencies  have
obstacles and challenges  they  have faced to implement it.  been given.  In fact, contrary to popular belief,  less than
In an attempt to shed  !l.ght on  this area, de  Luna  50 percent of the agencies  can be categorized  as mega-
Martinez and Rose present the results of a survey  supervisors. Another finding  is that in most countries
conducted  in a group of 15 countries that have adopted  progress toward the harmonization of prudential
integrated  supervision. After a brief review of the  regulation and supervision  across financial  intermediaries
literature  on integrated  supervision, the authors examine  remains limited.  Interestingly,  the survey revealed that
four topics:  practically all countries believe they have  achieved a
* The reasons cited  by this group of countries for  higher degree  of harmonization  in the regulation and
establishing an integrated  supervisory agency.  supervision of banks and securities companies than
* The scope of regulatory  and supervisory powers of  between banks and insurance  firms. The survey also
these agencies.  identified some practical problems faced by this group of
* The progress of these agencies in harmonizing their  countries  in establishing their unified  supervisory
regulatory and supervisory practices across the  agencies. The authors discuss these  problems, along with
intermediaries they supervise.  the practical lessons and recommendations  provided by
* The practical problems faced by policymakers  in  the 15  agencies to other countries considering  integrated
adopting integrated  supervision.  supervision,  in the final section of the paper.
This paper-a product of Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department
to analyze recent developments in financial sector regulation and supervision.  Copies of the paper are available  free from
theWorld Bank, 1818 H StreetNW,Washington,  DC 20433. Please contactSusana Coca, roomMC9-757,  telephone 202-
473-7474,  fax 202-522-3475,  email  address scoca@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working Papers are also posted on
the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  jdelunamartinez@worldbank.org  or
trose@worldbank.org.  July 2003.  (44 pages)
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At the end of 2002,  at least 46 countries had adopted the so-called model of unified or integrated
supervision  by  either  establishing  a  single  supervisor  for  their  entire  financial  sector  or  by
centralizing  in  one  agency  the  powers  to  supervise  at  least  two  of  their  main  financial
intermediaries  (such  as  banking  with  insurance,  banking  with  securities  or  securities  with
insurance).'  The number of countries adopting integrated supervision  has increased rapidly in the
past  six  years.  The  creation  of  the  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  (FSA)  in  the  United
Kingdom,  announced  in  1997,  provided  an  enormous  impetus  for  the establishment  of unified
supervisory agencies in many developed and developing countries.  The most recent examples of
countries adopting a single supervisor are  Estonia, Germany,  Ireland and Malta (2002).
Countries  that  have  adopted  integrated  supervision  believe  that  a  single  supervisor  is  more
effective  than  multiple  supervisors  in  monitoring  risks  across  financial  institutions  and
responding to real or potential  threats that may undermine the stability of a financial system. By
centralizing  the supervision  of a  financial  system in a single  institution,  a supervisor  can better
understand  risks  arising  not  only  at  a  single  financial  intermediary,  but  also  at  a  group  of
intermediaries  as  well  as  within  the  entire  financial  system.  Furthermore,  unlike  a  system of
multiple supervisors  in which accountability  may be easily diffused in case of regulatory failure,
a single  supervisor becomes  the  only agency  accountable  for monitoring  risks  in the  financial
system.  Moreover,  it  is  believed  that  a  single  supervisor  can  better  supervise  financial
conglomerates  and minimize regulatory arbitrage by applying a consistent approach to regulation
and supervision across all the different segments of the financial system.
Several  authors2 believe that there  are good reasons  for keeping  financial  supervisory  agencies
separate.  In  their  view,  specialized  agencies  may be  better prepared  than  a  single  agency  to
recognize  and properly  address the unique characteristics  of each type of financial intermediary.
Moreover,  if the  mandate  of each  supervisory  agency  is  clearly  defined,  it may  be  easier  to
ensure  proper  accountability  among  them.  Furthermore,  if  a  country  establishes  effective
mechanisms  to  ensure  communication  and  policy  coordination  among  supervisory  agencies,
there  is  no  reason  why  these  agencies  should  be  less  effective  than  a  single  supervisor  in
monitoring  a  financial  system.  In  addition,  the  establishment  of  a  single  supervisory  body
eliminates the system of checks  and balances  available  in a system of multiple  supervisors  and
could result in a bureaucratic  entity unable to rapidly respond to market developments.
The  debate  on  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  integrated  supervision  has  become
increasingly  more  important  in  recent  years,  as  a  growing  number  of  countries  assess  the
appropriateness  of its adoption.  This paper attempts to examine  the experience  of countries that
have  adopted  integrated  supervision  and  show  the  complexity  of tasks  involved  in  making
integrated supervision work. This paper focuses on the following issues:
'How  Countries Supervise Their Banks, Insurers, and Securities Markets.  2003. London, Freshfields.
2  See  Charles  Goodhart  (2001):  The  Organisational  Structure  of  Banking  Supervision.  (Basel,
Switzerland,  FSI Occasional Papers, No 1, Financial Stability Institute.
2*  What are the advantages and disadvantages of integrated supervision?
*  What are the reasons for adopting  integrated supervision?
*  How  powerful  are  the  new  integrated  supervisory  agencies  in  terms  of  the  sectors  they
oversee and the regulatory and supervisory powers they have been given?
*  How far have countries gone in harmonizing their regulatory and supervisory practices?
*  What  are  some  of the  practical  obstacles  faced  by  policy-makers  in  adopting  integrated
supervision?
This  paper  is  based  on  the  results  of a  survey  conducted  by  the  authors  in  a  group  of  15
developed  and  developing  countries  that  have  established  a  single  supervisory  agency  or,
alternatively,  an agency that oversees  at least two of the main types of financial intermediaries  in
a  country,  including:  Australia,  Canada,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Korea,  Latvia,
Luxembourg,  Malta,  Mexico,  Norway,  Singapore,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Senior
officials  of  the  new  unified  agencies  of  this  group  of  countries  kindly  responded  to  a
questionnaire sent by the authors (see Annex  1 for the questionnaire).
In addition, the authors had the opportunity to review  a survey conducted among the members of
the  international  group  of integrated  supervisors  in  1999  and discuss  with  some of them their
valuable  experiences  on integrated supervision.3 In comparison to that survey, which is based on
a  limited group  of developed  economies,  this  survey covered  both developed  and  developing
countries.  It  also  updated  some  of the  data and  included new areas  with regard  to the  size  of
financial systems and financial conglomerates.
This  paper will proceed  as follows.  The  first section  briefly reviews  the  arguments  in favor  of
and  against  integrated  supervision  and  examines  the  reasons  for  adopting  it  in  the  countries
covered  in  the  survey.  Section  two  assesses  how  powerful  the  new  integrated  supervisory
agencies are in terms of the sectors they oversee  and the regulatory and supervisory powers they
have been given. In the third section we try to measure and compare how far countries have gone
in integrating their regulatory and supervisory practices.  Finally,  in the fourth section we discuss
the  complexity  of merging  different  supervisory  agencies,  drawing  useful  lessons  for  other
countries  considering or planning to adopt integrated supervision,  and identifying possible areas
for future research.
I Arguments  in Favor and Against Integrated Supervision
Traditionally,  most  countries  have  regulated  and  supervised  their  financial  intermediaries
through  multiple  institutions,  including  the  ministry  of finance,  the  central  bank,  as  well  as
specialized  supervisory  agencies,  such  as  banking,  securities  and  insurance  commissions  (or
superintendencies).  Over  the  years,  some  countries  have  established  additional  agencies  to
oversee  particular  market  activities  (such  as  derivatives),  to  supervise  particular  types  of
intermediaries  (e.g.  credit unions,  mortgage  banks,  thrift  companies  and pension  funds),  or to
3 The results of that survey are available at:
http://www.apra.gov.au/Policy/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfin&PagelD=  1114
3deal with consumer protection  issues in the financial sector industry.4 The number of regulatory
and supervisory  authorities can be  even larger in countries  with a federal political organization,
where  local  authorities  may  have  some  responsibility  in  the  supervision  of  certain  types  of
financial internediaries  operating in their respective jurisdictions.5
Although the model of multiple regulators  and supervisors prevails  in most regions in the world,
in  the  last 20  years  an  increasing  number  of countries  have  started  to  examine  the way  they
regulate  and  supervise  financial  intermediaries.  As  shown  in  Table  1, at the  end  of 2002,  46
countries had adopted the so-called model of unified or integrated supervision by either creating
a  single  regulator  for  the  entire  financial  sector  or  by merging  two  of the  main  supervisory
authorities (such as banking with insurance, banking with securities or securities with insurance).
In  1986,  Norway  became  the  first  country  to  establish  a  single  supervisory  authority  for  its
banking,  securities  and  insurance  sectors.  In  1988  and  1991,  Denmark  and  Sweden  also
established  their  own  single  regulatory  bodies,  respectively.  The  creation  of  the  Financial
Supervisory  Authority  (FSA)  in  the  United  Kingdom,  announced  in May  1997,  provided  an
enormous  impetus  for the establishment  of single regulators  in many other countries,  given the
role of London as  one of the leading  financial  centers  around the  globe.  Since then,  many other
developed  and developing  countries  have followed  suit in establishing  single  regulatory  bodies
or have merged  at  least  two  of the  existing  agencies  responsible  for components  of financial
sector  supervision.  The  most  recent  examples  of countries  adopting  a  single  supervisor  are
Estonia, Germany, Ireland,  and Malta (2002).
Reportedly,  there are currently at least seven countries considering adopting a form of integrated
supervision,  including  Bulgaria,  Indonesia,  Kazakhstan,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  and
Ukraine.  Moreover,  even  some of the countries  that have established partially  unified agencies,
such as Mexico and South Africa,  are now considering the establishment of a single regulator.
4 Examples  include  the US  Commodity  Futures  Trading  Commission or the National  Commission  for
Pension Funds in Mexico.
5  Good examples are  Canada and the United States.  In Canada securities  activities  are supervised by local
securities  authorities,  whereas  in  the  United  States  insurance  companies  are  regulated  by  state
supervisors.  Moreover,  in the  United  States,  some  state  chartered  banks  are  supervised  by both state
authorities  as well as federal  bank supervisory agencies.
4Table 1.  Countries with a Single Supervisor,  Semi-integrated Supervisory  Agencies  and Multiple Supervisors in 2002*
Agency  Supervising 2 Types of Fin. Intermediaries  Multiple Supervisors
Single  Supervisor  . . (at least one for banks, one for securities
for the Financial System  securities fiands  insurers  firms and one for insurers)
1.  Austria  12.  Japan  23.  Dominican  29.  Australia  40.  Bolivia  47.  Argentina  62.  Italy
2.  Bahrain  13.  Latvia  Republic  30.  Belgium  41.  Chile  48.  Bahamas  63.  Jordan
3.  Bermuda  14.  Maldives  24.  Finland  31.  Canada  42.  Egypt  49.  Barbados  64.  Lithuania
4.  Cayman  15.  Malta  25.  Luxembourg  32.  Colombia  43.  Mauritius  50.  Botswana  65.  Netherlands
Islands  16.  Nicaragua  26.  Mexico  33.  Ecuador  44.  Slovakia  51.  Brazil  66.  New Zealand
5.  Denmark  17.  Norway  27.  Switzerland  34.  El Salvador  45.  South Africa  52.  Bulgaria  67.  Panama
6.  Estonia  18.  Singapore  28.  Uruguay  35.  Guatemala  46.  Ukraine  53.  China  68.  Philippines
7.  Gernany  19.  South  36.  Kazakhstan  54.  Cyprus  69.  Poland
8.  Gibraltar  Korea  37.  Malaysia  55.  Egypt  70.  Portugal
9.  Hungary  20.  Sweden  38.  Peru  56.  France  71.  Russia
10.  Iceland  21.  UAE  39.  Venezuela  57.  Greece  72.  Slovenia
11.  Ireland  22.  UK  58.  Hong Kong  73.  Sri Lanka
59.  India  74.  Spain
60.  Indonesia  75.  Thailand
61.  Israel  76.  Turkey
77.  USA
As percent of all countries in the sample
29%  8%  13%  9%  38%
* Sample includes only countries that supervise  all the three types of intermediaries (banks, securities  firms and insurers).
Source: How Countries Supervise  Their Banks,  Insurers, and Securities Markets. 2003. London,  Freshfields.
5As  indicated  in  Table  2,  there  are  numerous  arguments  in  favor  of and  against  integrated
supervision. In this section, we review some of the main arguments  on both sides.
Table 2. Arguments in Favor and Against Integrated Supervision
In Favor  Against
*  Facilitates the supervision of financial  *  The merger process may result in lower
conglomerates  on a consolidated basis.  supervisory effectiveness  during
. Allows better monitoring of issues  transition period  and possibly beyond.
affecting the entire financial  system, as  *  It may undermine the overall
well as rapid policy responses.  effectiveness of supervision by not
*  Allows the development and  recognizing the unique characteristics
implementation of a unified approach  of the banking,  securities and insurance
of regulation  and supervision across the  industnes.
entire financial system, reducing  *  There are other schemes to achieve
regulatory arbitrage.  prompt information-sharing  and
. Strengthens  accountability of  collaboration among existing agencies.
supervisors.  *  May only work in certain countries and
. Maximizes economies  of scale and  may be more suited for developed
scope, contributing to a better use of  financial systems.
resources.  *  Gains in terms of economies of scale
may not be significant.
1.1  Arguments in Favor
Some authors argue that, to be effective, the structure of supervisory agencies needs  to mirror the
structure of the  industry it supervises (R.  Abrams and M. Taylor,  2000).  If a country's  financial
system  evolves  towards  a  model  of universal  banking,  in  which  banks  are  allowed  to  offer  a
large  variety of financial  products  and  services  with few  restrictions,  then there  may be  good
reasons  for  adopting  integrated  supervision  instead  of  having  multiple  agencies  monitoring
different segments of the financial system.
In  the  last years,  market  developments  have  made  it more  difficult  to supervise  the  financial
sector  through  separate  agencies.  Supervisors  face  difficulties  in classifying  some  of the  new
financial  products under the traditional categories of banking, securities  or insurance. Nowadays,
practitioners  increasingly treat loans, securities  and insurance  policies  as part of a continuum  of
products that do the same thing: price risks. In many countries,  for instance, insurance  companies
are allowed to offer short-term deposit-like products.  Moreover, new types of securities products,
such as  credit derivatives,  bear  in practice many  of the  characteristics  of an insurance  product.
Furthermore,  the  securitization  of traditional  forms  of credit  (such  as  mortgages,  credit  card
receivables  and commercial  loans)  and the  proliferation  of increasingly  sophisticated  ways  of
bundling, repackaging  and trading risks, have weakened the distinction between equity, debt and
loans (see Clive Briault,  1999, p.  12).
6The  blurring  of  distinctions  between  banking,  securities  and  insurance  products  is  raising
concerns  about the  ability  of authorities  to effectively  monitor the  risks  associated  with these
products.  Questions  have  arisen  as  to the  ability  of multiple supervisors  organized  by type  of
intermediary rather than by type of risk to be responsive to the changes  and to oversee the sector.
The growing number of financial  conglomerates  has also posed enormous  challenges to national
supervisory  authorities,  since  risks  have  become  more  difficult  to  monitor,  not just because
financial institutions  tend to be larger and more complex, but also because they operate in most
segments of the financial system.
To respond to the above mentioned challenges, advocates of integrated supervision believe that a
unified  supervisory  agency with authority  over all,  or most all  financial  intermediaries,  can be
more  effective  than  multiple  supervisors  in  monitoring  risks  across  the  financial  system  and
responding  to  possible  threats  to the  stability of the  financial  system.  By bringing  together or
centralizing  the  supervision  of  a  financial  system  in  a  single  institution,  the  new  unified
supervisor:
*  Can better understand  and monitor risk  transfers  among  different  financial  intermediaries
and market segments.
*  Can better assess the real  and potential  impact, on all  sectors,  of industry  and market-wide
issues  affecting  the  financial  system,  such  as  turbulence  in  markets  and  economies,  the
development  of  e-commerce,  the  shift  to  low  inflation,  the  implications  of  emerging
demographic  changes, etc.
*  Can better understand the cross-sector nature of the business of financial  conglomerates.
*  Is better prepared to develop policies  to address the risks affecting  a financial  conglomerate
as well as its single entities.
*  Is better prepared to  develop  a consistent  supervisory approach  to monitor similar financial
products and services effectively regardless of what type of financial institution carries them
out.
Moreover,  from  this point of view,  a single  or unified  supervisor has  several  advantages  over
multiple  supervisors,  because  it  minimizes  some  of  the  problems  that  often  arise  when
intermediaries  are supervised by multiple agencies, such as:
*  regulatory  arbitrage,
*  gaps in regulation and supervision,
*  lack of coordination and communication between financial supervisory agencies, and
*  weak accountability of supervisory agencies
A  unified  supervisory  system  seems  to  be  better  prepared  to  mitigate  regulatory  arbitrage,
because  it  is  better  prepared  to  develop  and  apply  regulations  and  supervisory  processes
consistently.  In  addition,  the  information  available  to  the  integrated  supervisor  can  be  more
quickly and effectively utilized.  Moreover, by becoming the only contact point for entities  for all
regulatory  and supervisory  issues,  a single regulator becomes responsible  in preventing  gaps in
regulation  and  supervision.  Furthermore,  a  unified  supervisor  becomes  accountable  for  its
7statutory objectives.  The blame  cannot be passed from one  supervisor to another if supervisory
failure occurs.
There  are  other  important  arguments  in  favor  of unification,  such  as  the  maximization  of
economies  of scale  resulting  from  merging  two  or more  of the  existing  supervisory  agencies.
Economies  of  scale  arise  from  the  move  to  a  single  set  of unified  management,  a  unified
approach  to standard-setting,  authorization,  supervision,  enforcement,  and a single  set of central
support services, etc.  Furthernore, the consolidation of human capital can increase efficiency by
permitting  management  to  direct  the  best  people  to  the  most  critical  situations.  Moreover,
integrated supervision can reduce  the amount of information that financial intermediaries  need to
report  to  supervisory  agencies.  A unified  supervisor  becomes  the  only authority  that requests
information  from financial intermediaries,  mitigating duplications  in the type of information that
supervised  entities  have  to  report  to  different  financial  authorities,  usually  under  different
formats.
1.2 Arguments Against Integrated Supervision
An important  argument against integrated  supervision  is that if the process of merging different
agencies  is not properly managed,  it may result in the  departure  of experienced  personnel  and
demoralization  of other  staff,  affecting  overall  supervisory  effectiveness  during  the  transition
period.6 Moreover,  a mega-regulator may become  excessively bureaucratic in its procedures,  and
slow to react to problems as they emerge.
There  is also the risk that the  effectiveness  of supervision  may be affected if the new integrated
agency  fails to  develop  a  consistent  framework  of regulation  and supervision  for the financial
sector.  While  a certain  degree  of harmonization  of supervisory  practices  between  the banking,
securities  and insurance  supervisors  is desirable to reduce  regulatory  arbitrage,  it is important  to
recognize  the particular  characteristics of each industry, each one requiring specific regulations.
A unified  supervisor  may  fail  to  develop  such  a  framework,  affecting  the  overall  quality  of
supervision.7 For  instance,  in  the  event  the  banking  regulator  --  accustomed  to  protecting
depositors  as well as the banking system -- assumes  a dominant role in the integrated supervisory
agency,  it may not be prepared  to supervise  the securities  industry properly.  Moreover,  there  is
the risk that an underdeveloped  capital market may not be given sufficient flexibility to develop.
Another  important  argument  against  integrated  supervision  is  that  not  all  countries  may  be
prepared to adopt it. If the supervision of financial markets is poor under separate entities, it will
continue to be weak under a unified regime.  Unless weaknesses in regulation  and supervision are
effectively  addressed  there  may be  little  or no  improvement.  It might be  wiser  to address  the
weaknesses  in  supervision  before  discussing  the  number  of agencies  that  should  supervise  a
financial system.
For  countries  trying  to  improve  the  communication  and  collaboration  among  their  different
supervisors,  integrated supervision  may not always  be the most appropriate way to achieve this.
6  See e.g. Goodhart (n 1  above).
7  It should be noted that countries  with multiple supervisors may also fail to develop a unified approach to
regulation  and supervision.
8There  are  other effective ways to achieve these  objectives,  such as  special committees  in which
senior  policy  makers  from  different  agencies  regularly  meet  and  share  relevant  information.
Moreover,  effective  collaboration  among  agencies  can  also be achieved through Memoranda  of
Understanding  (MOUs)  which  formalize  arrangements  for  the  exchange  of information  and
policy  coordination  among  entities.  Furthermore,  in  certain cases,  a  country's  legal  framework
may allow  a supervisory agency to become  the "lead" supervisor  in key issues involving two or
more agencies,  such as the resolution of a failing financial conglomerate.
Finally, in some cases the economies  of scale supposedly associated with the  establishment of a
unified agency may not be sufficient enough to justify the merger of the institutions.8
1.3 Forces Driving the Establishment of Integrated Supervisory Agencies
What are the main factors  leading an increasing  number of developed and developing countries
to adopt integrated  supervision?  As shown in Table 3,  the  15  countries  that participated  in this
survey  indicated  several  reasons  for  adopting  integrated  supervision,  including,  by order  of
importance,  the following:
Table 3. Main Reasons for Adopting Integrated Supervision
(% of Agencies  that Indicated any of the Following  Reasons)
Reasons  N.  As % of all
of agencies  agencies
1.  Need  to  better  supervise  a  financial  system  moving  14  93%
towards universal banking.
2.  Maximize economies of scale and scope.  12  80%
3.  Need  to  solve  problems  resulting  from  poor  4  27%
communication and  a lack of cooperation  among existing
supervisory agencies.
4.  Minimize gaps in the regulation and supervision of  3  20%
financial  intermediaries  by establishing a single authority
accountable for the supervision of all financial institutions.
5.  Need for  operational  restructuring  of regulatory  agencies  3  20%
(in particular, after a financial crisis).
6.  Overcome  other  weaknesses  in  the  overall  quality  of  2  13%
financial regulation and supervision.
Countries included:  Australia,  Canada, Denmark,  Estonia, Hungary,  Iceland, Korea,  Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta,
Mexico, Norway,  Singapore,  Sweden and the United Kingdom
Almost  all  countries  covered  in  the  survey  indicated  having  adopted  integrated  supervision  in
response to the  growing importance  of financial conglomerates  and blurring distinctions  among
8  There is still not much evidence that the operating costs of new unified agencies  are lower than the sum
of its individual predecessor  regulatory  bodies.  So  far,  few agencies,  such  as  the FSA in the UK,  have
confimned  that  their  operating  costs  are  lower.  See:  Clive  Briault  (2001):  Building  a Single  Financial
Regulator. Paper prepared for the Conference on "Challenges for Unified Financial  Supervision", 2-3 July
2001, Tallinn, Estonia.
9some of the  banking,  securities  and  insurance  products,  which  have made  it more  difficult  for
countries to supervise their financial sectors through separate agencies.
In practically  all  countries  covered  in  this  survey,  the  financial  sector  industry  has  undergone
major changes  in  recent  years.  Deregulation,  liberalization  and  rapid  technological  innovation
have  allowed  financial  intermediaries  to  offer  an  increasing  variety  of financial  products  and
services,  making  the  traditional  frontiers  between  banking,  securities  and  insurance  sectors
blurred.  Moreover,  in  order  to  remain  competitive  in  the  global  marketplace,  financial
institutions  have  acquired  or merged  with  other  domestic  or foreign  financial  intermediaries,
giving rise to a large number of financial conglomerates.
As shown in  Chart 1, on average,  the market  share of financial  conglomerates  operating  in the
banking,  securities  and  insurance  industries  has  rapidly  increased  in  the  last  12  years  in  the
countries  covered  in  this  survey  (market  share  measured  as  percentage  of assets  of financial
intermediaries belonging  to a conglomerate with respect to total assets of intermediaries  in each
industry).9 In the area of banking,  the market share of conglomerates  increased  from 53  per cent
in  1990 to  71  per  cent at  the  end of 2001.  During  the  same  time period,  the  market share  of
conglomerates  in  the securities  industry  increased  from  54  per cent  to  63  per  cent,  and  in the
insurance  industry from 41  per cent to 70 per cent (for a breakdown of figures by country,  please
see Annex 2).
Chart 1. Average Market Share of Financial Conglomerates
in Banking, Securities and Insurance Sectors in Selected  Countries
(1990*  vs. 2001)
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*1990 or earliest available  year (See Annex 2 for country breakdown).
Countries  included: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland,  Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta,
Norway, Singapore,  Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
9 For the purposes  of this paper,  a financial  conglomerate  is defined as  "any  group of companies  under
common  control whose  exclusive or predominant activities  consist of providing significant  services  in at
least two  different financial sectors  (banking,  securities,  insurance)".  Such an entity is likely to combine
businesses  which  are  subject  to  different  schemes  of  supervision  and  might  also  include  financial
activities  which,  in many  countries,  are  not  conducted  in  an  entity  which  is  subject  to  solo  prudential
supervision (e.g.  leasing, consumer credit, certain financial derivatives).
10From  a  supervisory  point of view,  the  growing  importance  of financial  conglomerates  poses
enormous  challenges,  since  risks become  more  difficult to  monitor as  the conglomerate  grows
and expands  its activities  across the different  segments of a financial  system,  as well as to new
markets  overseas.  On  the  one  hand,  recent  research  suggests  that  the  trend  towards
conglomeration  may  increase  systemic  risks,  even  after  taking  account  of  the  gains  of
diversification  associated  with conglomeration.10 On the other hand, supervisors  face problems
in  calculating  a  financial  conglomerate's  overall  solvency,  since  the  conglomerate  may
artificially  inflate  a firm's  capital base.1'  Monitoring  intra-group  transactions  to ensure that risk
is not concentrated  in a single unit,  and watching for or preventing  conflicts  of interests  among
the  different  firms  that  form  a  conglomerate  becomes  increasingly  more  difficult  as  the
conglomerate becomes larger and more complex.
According to this survey,  12 out of 15 countries  have adopted integrated  supervision in order to
maximize  economies  of scale  and scope,  thus  reducing  the  operating  costs  of having  several
supervisory  entities  and centralizing  in a  single agency  the  functions of two or more agencies.
This  was  a  strong  argument  for the  adoption  of integrated  supervision  in practically  all  small
economies covered in this survey, including Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, and Malta.
Another important reason  for adopting  integrated  supervision has been the need to prevent  gaps
(as well  as overlaps)  in the regulation and supervision of financial  intermediaries.  In fact, one of
the  problems  of  supervising  financial  institutions  through  multiple  agencies  has  been  the
existence  of gaps  or  overlaps  in the  allocation  of responsibilities  among  supervisors.  In  most
cases,  the lack of a precise definition of roles and responsibilities  among entities  has resulted in
weak  accountability.  Thus,  by creating a  (fully or partially)  unified supervisor for the financial
system,  countries  have attempted to reduce  the number of unregulated  areas by giving  a single
agency the mandate to supervise most or the entire financial system.
Three of the  15  countries  analyzed in the survey adopted integrated supervision  in the aftermath
of a  major  financial  crisis.  Mexico  and  South  Korea,  for  instance,  established  integrated
supervisors  immediately  after their  financial  crises  erupted  in December  1994  and November
1997, respectively.  Sweden  also established  a single supervisor  after its banking sector crisis in
the early 80s. Other countries,  such as Iceland, have  adopted integrated  supervision  as part of a
major effort  to  strengthen  financial  regulation  and  supervision  by moving  key responsibilities
from the Ministry of Finance to a separate  and autonomous agency.
Another important factor  leading countries to adopt integrated  supervision has been  the need to
overcome  deficiencies  in communication  and  cooperation  among  existing regulatory  agencies.
Reportedly,  in 4 out 15  countries agencies  had problems in communicating and sharing relevant
information  promptly.  Countries  such  as Mexico  did made  several  attempts  to create  effective
mechanisms  for information  sharing  and policy coordination  among their different  supervisory
10  Gianni  de  Nicol6  and  Myron Kwast  (2002):  Systemic  Risk  and Financial  Consolidation.  Are  They
Related? IMF Working Paper, WP/02/55.
"  A common technique is "double or multiple gearing",  i.e. counting the same  capital twice in different
entities within the group.  Another  is "downstreaming"  of capital,  where a company issues debt and uses
the proceeds as equity for its subsidiaries.agencies.  However,  as the banking crisis erupted at the end of 1994, authorities  decided to merge
two of the main existing agencies, the National Banking Commission and the National Securities
Commission, instead of continuing  exploring other mechanisms  to improve communication  and
coordination among them. This was considered  a way to ensure better supervision.'2
II How Powerful Are the Integrated Supervisory Agencies?
People  normally  think  of  integrated  supervisory  agencies  as  "mega-supervisors",  that  is  as
agencies with a broad mandate to supervise  all types of financial intermediaries,  enforce existing
laws  and  regulations,  and  issue  or  amend  key prudential  rules  affecting  the  entire  financial
system.
At first glance, most of the unified agencies  analyzed in this survey seem powerful, because they
have  the  authority  to  supervise  multiple  financial  intermediaries,  including  banks,  securities
firms,  insurance  companies  and other types of financial intermediaries.  As shown in Table 4, 11
out of the  15  countries analyzed here have established a single supervisor for the entire financial
sector  industry  and  only  four  countries  have  opted  for  a  partially  unified  agency,  including
Australia and Canada where the securities industry is supervised by separate entities, and Mexico
and  Luxembourg,  where  the  insurance  companies  have  a  separate  supervisor.  Except  for
Singapore, which decided to concentrate the powers to regulate and supervise the entire financial
system  in  the  central  bank,  all  other  countries  that  have  adopted  integrated  supervision  have
created a separate supervisory agency outside the central bank.
However,  a careful analysis of the regulatory  and supervisory  powers these agencies  have been
granted reveals that not all of them are as powerful  as they seem. In fact, the ministries of finance
and  central  banks  continue  to  play  a  key  role  in  issuing  and  amending  relevant  prudential
regulations,  authorizing or revoking  licenses  to  financial  intermediaries,  and establishing  other
important laws for the entire financial  system.
12  The  experience  of  Mexico,  however,  should  not  suggest  that  adequate  communication  and
coordination  among supervisory  entities can not be achieved,  but rather that in some countries it may be
difficult to find adequate mechanisms and institutional settings to achieve it.
12Table 4. Financial Intermediaries Supervised by the Unified Agencies
Year of  =  =  Intermediaries Supe  vised bv the Unified Agencies
Country  Name of Agency  creation*  Bankng  Securities  Insurance  Other  Intermediaries NOT
________________________creation*_NIBFIs  supervised  by the agency
1.  Australia  Australian Prudential Regulation  1997  X  X  X  Finance companies  and merchant
Authority (APRA)  banks
2.  Canada  Office of the Superintendent of Financial  1986  X  X  X  No
Institutions (OSFI)
3.  Denmark  Danish Financial Supervisory Authority  1988  X  X  X  X  No
(FINANSTILSYNET)
4.  Estonia  Financial Supervision Authority (FSA)  1999  X  X  X  X  Savings and loan associations
,_________  _________  __________  and currency exchange offices
5.  Hungary  Hungarian Financial Supervisory  2000  X  X  X  X  No
Authority (HFSA)
6.  Iceland  Financial Supervisory Authority  1988  X  X  X  X  Non-licensed collective
investment  firms
7.  Korea  Financial Supervisory Service (FSS)  1997  X  X  X  X  Deposit and insurance  activities  of
the Nat. Post Office, Community
Credit Cooperatives  and other.**
8.  Latvia  Financial and Capital Market  1998  X  X  X  X  Leasing companies
Commission
9.  Luxembourg  Commission de Surveillance  du Secteur  1999  X  X  n.a.
Financier
10.  Malta  Malta Financial Services Centre  2002  X  X  X  X  n.a.
11.  Mexico  National Banking and Securities  1994  X  X  X  Pension funds
Commission (CNBV)
12.  Norway  Kredittilsynet  1986  X  X  X  X  No
13.  Singapore  Monetary Authority  of Singapore  (MAS)  1984***  X  X  X  X  Credit cooperatives and leasing
_________________  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~companies.
14.  Sweden  Finansinspektionen  1990  X  X  X  X  No
15.  United  Financial Services Authority  1997  x  x  X  X  Mortgage  advisers and general
Kingdom  I_I  Iinsurance brokers.**  *
* Refers to the year in which the decision to establish the agency was made or the law allowing its creation came into force.
**Also  includes mutual aid businesses of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation  and National Federation  of Fisheries Cooperative.
***  MAS took over the regulation of the insurance industry  in 1977 and the regulatory functions of the securities industry  in 1984.
Starting 2004, mortgage advisers and general insurance brokers will be under the supervision of the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom.
132.1 Regulatory  and Supervisory Powers of Unified  Agencies
As part of this survey,  all integrated  agencies  were asked to indicate which of the following  10
supervisory  and  regulatory  powers  they  had been  given  and  can  use  in  the  segments  of the
financial system they oversee: 13
1.  Conduct on-site examinations.
2.  Conduct off-site examinations.
3.  Impose sanctions and fines for non-compliance with rules and regulations.
4.  Issue and amend prudential regulations  on credit, market and liquidity risks.
5.  Modify accounting and disclosure rules.
6.  Set  minimum  capital  requirements  and,  if deemed  appropriate,  require  intermediaries  to
comply  with  higher  requirements  or  grant  them  temporary  suspension  (regulatory
forbearance).
7.  Issue and amend rules on the composition of capital.
8.  Set general licensing requirements.
9.  Approve / revoke a license of an  intermediary.
10. Resolve issues related to consumer protection.
As shown in Chart 2,  the survey revealed that with regard to the banking industry,  the industry
supervised by all  agencies  of the  countries  covered  in the  survey,  only five out of 15  countries
have  given  their integrated  agencies  all  10  powers  described  above  (Denmark,  Korea,  Malta,
Singapore,  United Kingdom).  On the other side of the spectrum, Norway seems to have the most
limited agency with only four out of the ten powers. The remaining countries  have between five
and nine of the listed regulatory and supervisory powers.
13  Agency  may have many other powers  that are not reflected in this list.  For the purpose  of this  study,
this  list includes  only the  basic  powers  that an  integrated  agency with  wide  authority  in the  financial
sector is expected to have.










It is important to mention that the degree of concentration  of regulatory and supervisory powers
in a single agency is not necessarily correlated with the degree of supervisory effectiveness.  The
existence  of unified  agencies  with  few  regulatory  and  supervisory  powers  means  that  other
institutions,  such as the Ministry of Finance and/or the central bank,  continue to have important
regulatory and supervisory powers in the country in question.
The survey  also revealed  that the powers  of the unified  agencies  are basically  concentrated  in
core supervisory functions,  including the power to conduct  on-site and off-site examinations,  as
well  as  the  power  to  impose  sanctions  and  fines  on  financial  institutions  and  other  market
participants for non-compliance with existing laws and regulations. Practically all of the agencies
covered in this survey reported haying wide powers  in these areas.
15Table 5. The Powers of the Integrated Supervisory  Agencies  over Banks
Regulatory and Supervisory Powers  Number  As  % of all
of agencies  agencies
1.  Conduct on-site examinations  15  100
2.  Conduct off-site exarninations and surveillance  15  100
3.  Impose sanctions and fines for non-compliance  with
rules and regulations  15  100
4.  Set prudential regulations on market, credit,
operational  and liquidity risks  12  80
5.  Set accounting rules and information  disclosure
requirements  11  73
6.  Set rules on the composition of capital  11  73
7.  Approve and revoke  a license to a financial
intermediary  11  73
8.  Set minimum capital requirements  10  66
9.  Set licensing requirements  9  60
10.  Consumer protection (assist to resolve claims  for
abuses against users of financial services)  9  60
In terms of regulatory powers,  12 out of 15 of the agencies  can set or amend prudential  rules on
credit, market and liquidity risks. In countries where the supervisor can not directly set or amend
these prudential  rules,  it is  normally the Ministry  of Finance who  has the prerogative  to  do it.
Hungary is an interesting case, because the integrated  supervisor was established  without giving
it any of the aforementioned regulatory powers. The Hungarian Financial  Supervisory Authority
was  conceived as purely a supervisory entity.  Setting or amending financial sector regulations  in
Hungary is the exclusive prerogative of the Ministry of Finance.' 4
As  shown  in the Table  5,  11  out of 15  agencies  can  directly  set or change  the  accounting  and
disclosure  rules applicable  to  financial  institutions.  In  countries  where  the  unified agency  does
not have  this  prerogative,  such  as  Australia,  there  is normally  an  independent  body,  usually  a
professional  association  of  accountants  that  is  responsible  for  setting  the  rules.  However,  in
practically all  countries  in which an independent  entity is responsible for setting the accounting
rules,  the  supervisory  agency has the  ability  to  request  a  review  of accounting  practices  and
influence changes in the desired direction.
The  survey  also  revealed  that  11  out  of 15  agencies  have  powers  to  establish the  rules  on  the
composition of capital. Interestingly, only  10 agencies  can set the minimum  capital requirements
that  financial intermediaries  must observe.  In cases where the supervisor  can not set this type of
prudential rule directly,  it is the Ministry of Finance that normally does so.
Similarly, nine out of 15  agencies have the power to set the minimum licensing requirements  and
11  to approve or revoke a license to a financial intermediary. Traditionally,  granting or revoking
14  Laws,  however,  grant the Hungarian Financial  Supervisory  Authority  (HFSA) the right to  express its
opinion  when  laws  affecting  the  financial  system  or the  institutions  and  persons  under  its control  are
being prepared.  Moreover,  the President of the  HFSA has the right to participate  in government sessions
on issues affecting  the regulation  and supervision of the financial  system.
16a  license  has  been an important  prerogative  of the Ministry of Finance.  The survey confirmed
that  this practice  continues  in four of the  countries  that have adopted  integrated  supervision,
including  Iceland,  Luxemburg,  Mexico  and Norway.'5 In the  countries  where  the  Ministry  of
Finance  is  responsible  for  granting  or  revoking  licenses,  the  supervisor  plays  a  key  role  in
advising the Ministry of Finance on the moral integrity and technical  expertise of the prospective
owners  and  managers,  and  in assessing  the  feasibility  of the  proposed  business  plans of the
prospective new financial institutions.
Interestingly,  in  six  countries,  including  Australia,  Canada,  Latvia,  Mexico,  Norway  and
Sweden,  the integrated supervisory  agency is not empowered to handle and resolve consumers'
complaints  against  financial  institutions.  In  those  countries,  consumer  protection  issues  are
normally  handled by judicial  authorities  whenever  users  of financial  services  can not  reach  a
satisfactory agreement with financial  institutions. In 1999,  Mexico established a separate agency
to prevent  abuses by financial  intermediaries  and to resolve any type of consumers'  claims  in the
financial  sector industry.'6
In summary,  the survey revealed that the group of unified supervisory  agencies covered in this
survey is not as homogenous  as it seems at first sight. On the one hand, there is a group of single
supervisors with wide regulatory  and supervisory powers  over the intermediaries  they supervise
(Denmark,  Korea,  Malta,  Singapore,  and United Kingdom).  On the other hand,  there is  second
group of single  supervisors  with limited regulatory  powers (Estonia,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Latvia,
Norway  and  Sweden).  Finally,  there  is  a  third  group  of partially  unified  agencies  that  only
supervise  2 of the  3 main  sectors  in the financial  system  (Australia,  Canada,  Luxembourg  and
Mexico).
As a group, the unified supervisory agencies tend to have wide powers to supervise the financial
system,  but less to regulate  it. In many countries,  the Ministry of Finance continues  to play an
important  role  in  setting  the  key  prudential  rules,  including  risk  management  and  solvency
requirements.  Moreover,  in several countries,  the approval or revocation of licenses still remains
the prerogative of the  Ministry of Finance.  Finally,  several agencies  lack the powers  to resolve
consumer protection issues.
III. Harmonizing  Regulatory and Supervisory Processes Across the Financial
System
In  countries  that  have  adopted  integrated  supervision,  as  well  as  in countries  with  multiple
supervisors,  a certain  degree  of harmonization  of supervisory  and regulatory practices  between
the banking,  securities  and insurance  supervisors is desirable to prevent regulatory  arbitrage  and
make  sure  that  similar  risks  are  measured  using  consistent  parameters  and  methodologies,
regardless of the type of financial intermediary that has undertaken them.
15  Interestingly, Kredittilsynet of Norway has the power to approve and  revoke licenses for intermediaries
in the securities market, i.e. investment firms and asset management funds, and also for insurance brokers.
16  See  the  National  Commission  to  Protect  and  Defend  the  Users  of  Financial  Services:
www.condusef.gob.mx.
17This  implies  moving  away  from  an institutional  type of regulation,  in  which  several  agencies
monitor the  risks  incurred  by each  type  of financial  intermediary,  to  functional  regulation,  in
which  the  supervisory  agencies  (or  the  unified  supervisor)  monitor  the  risks  associated  with
financial  operations  and  activities  arising  at  single  institutions,  as  well as  financial  groups  and
the entire financial system.
In  countries that have  adopted integrated supervision,  failure  to develop a unified regulatory and
supervisory  framework  for  the  financial  sector  is  likely  to  prevent  the  integration  of former
supervisory  agencies.  In fact,  a unified agency may easily become  a simple umbrella providing
just  a common name to  all former  supervisory  agencies,  but allowing  each  of them to  operate
with the same regulatory and supervisory approaches  as before.
As  discussed  below,  more  work  is  needed  by  international  standard-setting  bodies  in  the
financial  sector  in  order  to  determine  the  areas  in  which  harmonization  of  regulatory  of
supervisory  practices  across  different  types  of financial  intermediaries  could  and  should  be
achieved.  The discussion of this issue is beyond the purpose of this paper.  In this section we try
to  provide  a  brief  indication  of  the  existing  degree  of  harmonization  of  regulatory  and
supervisory practices  in the group of countries that has adopted integrated supervision.  Agencies
were asked to assess by themselves the degree of harmonization in the  following seven areas:
1.  On-site supervision
2.  off-site monitoring and analysis
3.  consolidated supervision
4.  components of capital
5.  minimum capital requirements
6.  licensing requirements
7.  accounting standards
The  following  sections  summarize  the  countries'  responses  with  respect  to  their progress  in
harmonizing regulatory  and supervisory practices  applicable to banks, securities  companies  and
insurers.17 First  we  compare  the  degree  of  regulatory  harmonization  between  banking  and
securities  sectors.  Then,  we  compare  the  degree  of  regulatory  harmonization  between  the
banking and insuraiice sectors.
''  Given  the  limnitations  of any  survey  as  an  analytical  tool,  the results  should  be  taken  cautiously,
especially because  no  detailed review of current regulatory  and  supervisory  practices  was  conducted  to
validate  the results. The results of this survey should be seen as an  indication of what countries  think of
themselves  in terms of progress  in harmonizing  regulatory  and  supervisory practices  applicable  to their
different types of financial  intermediaries.
183.1 Integrating Banking and Securities Supervision
As  shown  in  Table  6,  there  seems  to  be  a  high  degree  of integration  between  banking  and
securities  supervision  in the  countries  covered in the  survey.  The  average  level  of integration,
measured  through an index formulated  on the basis of the responses of countries to question 4.6
of the questionnaire  (please  see Annex  1),  indicates a degree  of integration  of 73 per cent,  in a
scale ranging from 0 per cent (no integration at all) to 100 per cent (full integration). The areas of
higher  integration  include  accounting  rules  and  off-site  monitoring  and  analysis,  both  with  a
degree  of integration  of  79  per  cent.  The  areas  with  less  integration  between  banking  and
securities  supervision  include  minimum  capital  adequacy  requirements  and  requirements  for
licensing, with a degree of 69 per cent and 63 per cent of integration, respectively.
Table 6. Harmonization between Banking and Securities Supervision
as of Dec.  2001
Variables  Index
1.  Accounting rules  79%
2.  Off-site monitoring and analysis  79%
3.  Consolidated supervision  76%
4.  Components of capital  73%
5.  On-site supervision  72%
6.  Minimum capital adequacy requirements  69%
7.  Licensing requirements  63%
Average  73%
Countries included in the sample: Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico,
Norway,  Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
In most  countries  covered  in  the  survey,  the  accounting  principles  used  for the  valuation  of
securities  tend  to  be  similar  for  both  banks  and  securities  firms.  There  are,  however,  some
differences  in the  accounting treatment used  in both types  of intermediaries  with  regard to the
adjustments  required  when  computing  the  net  adjusted  capital  of  securities  companies.  In
Singapore,  for example,  securities  firms  have  to  calculate  adjusted  net capital  after  deducting
investments  in  subsidiaries  and associated  companies.  Banks  calculate  their capital  adequacy
ratio  at  the  group  level  by consolidating  the  value  of such  investments  net  of goodwill  and
treating them as risk-weighted  assets.
Off-Site,  On-Site, and Consolidated Supervision
Most countries reported  a high level  of consistency in their practices  for off-site supervision of
banks and  securities firms.1 8 Reportedly,  most integrated agencies  utilize similar procedures  for
collecting data from banks and securities companies.  In fact,  in some countries,  such as the UK,
a single financial reporting  framework has been recently  introduced  to collect information  from
18  The  survey  covers  only issues  related  to the  supervision  of securities  firms.  The  scope  of securities
supervision  is  broader.  Besides  securities  firms,  securities  supervisors  monitor  securities  markets,
exchanges,  collective investment  schemes and disclosure by issuers.
19both types  of intermediaries.  Moreover,  countries  use similar  stress  tests  and other  analytical
tools  to  assess the  financial  situation  of banks  and  securities  companies  and their  compliance
with prudential  ratios.  Similarly,  the approaches  to on-site  supervision  of banks  and securities
firms  tend  to  be  highly  consistent  in  most  countries  covered  in  this  survey.  Reportedly,
examiners  of banks  and  securities  firms  use the  same  manuals  to  assess  credit,  market  and
operational  risks, as well as corporate governance issues.
Overall,  countries  indicated  that,  to  the  extent  permitted  by  existing  internationally  accepted
standards  for bank  and  securities  supervision,  they  will  continue  to  work  towards  achieving
further  harmonization  in  the  supervision  of these  two  types  of  intermediaries.  Some  of the
agencies,  such as  the United Kingdom and Korea,  indicated they are in the process of creating  a
common  framework  for  both  on-site  as  well  as  off-site  supervision  for  all  financial
intermediaries.
With  the  exception  of Mexico,  all  countries  covered  in this  survey  supervise  banks  and their
affiliated  entities both  on an individual  as  well  as  on a consolidated  basis,  following the Basel
Committee's  Core  Principles  for Effective  Bank  Supervision.  In fact,  the  mere  existence  of a
single supervisor in most of these countries enables supervisors  to have access to information  on
bank and non-bank activities undertaken by the bank and its affiliated entities.
In  the European  Union  (EU),  financial  groups  that  do  not  contain  a  bank are  exempted  from
consolidated  supervision.  Reportedly,  many  other  non-EU  members  analyzed  in  this  survey
follow  the  same  approach.  This  is  consistent  with  the  Core  Principles  of  the  International
Organization  of  Securities  Commissions  (IOSCO)  which  do  not  prescribe  consolidated
supervision  for  securities  firms.1 9 Singapore  and  Korea  constitute  two  exceptions  to  this
approach.  In Singapore,  all regulated entities - including  securities  firms  -- that have  substantial
holdings  in  other  financial  companies  must  be  supervised  on  a  group-wide  basis.  In  Korea,
securities  firms  are supervised  only on an unconsolidated basis, but  authorities are  planning to
introduce consolidated supervision for this type of intermediary in the near future.20
Components  of Capital, Minimum Capital Requirements and Licensing
Another  area  in  which  a  high  degree  of regulatory  consistency  has  been  achieved  between
banking  and securities  is on the components  of capital for capital  adequacy  purposes. Members
of the European  Union lead the  group  of countries  with higher consistency  in this area.  This  is
due  to  the  fact  that  recent  EU  legislation  has  significantly  harmonized  capital  and  other
'9 Although  IOSCO principles do not prescribe  consolidated supervision,  they recommend  supervisors  to
obtain  information  about  the  activities  of a  broker-dealer  and  its  affiliates.  Moreover,  IOSCO  core
principles state that supervisors need to obtain information  about licensed and off-balance  sheet affiliates
of  supervised  entities.  IOSCO  core  principles  are  available  at:
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/OSCOPD82-English.pdf
20  The  FSS in Korea has been shifting its supervisory  emphasis to consolidated  supervision  since  1999.
The FSS revised the  regulation on the management  evaluation of securities  companies  in February 2002
to perform  evaluations on a consolidated basis.
20prudential  requirements  for banks  and  securities  firms.2'  The  new  EU legislation  adopted  the
Bank  for International  Settlement  (BIS)  rules  for banking,  extending the  key principles of the
Basel Capital Accord to securities  firms.
However,  important  differences  arise  with  regard  to  capital  adequacy  requirements  between
banking and securities firms in some of the countries covered in this survey. In several countries,
non-current  assets are deducted from the capital of securities companies.  Other differences  arise
with regard to the frequency of reporting capital adequacy to the supervisor. In general, securities
companies  are required to report their capital  adequacy more frequently (normally on a monthly
basis) than banking intermediaries  (normally on a quarterly basis).
The survey also revealed that the criteria for licensing for banks and securities  companies  tends
to be different in many of the countries covered in the survey.  This is due to the fact that in some
countries banks are required to be licensed, but securities companies  are not. In many countries,
e.g.  Iceland,  securities  companies  are  required  to  register  with the  supervisor but  they do  not
need a license.  Moreover,  the evaluation of management  tends to play a bigger role in licensing
securities  companies,  whereas  good capital  and prudential  standards  are  seen as more important
in the licensing of banks.
3.2 Harmonization Between  Banking and Insurance Supervision
The degree of integration between banking and insurance  supervision seems to be lower than the
degree of harmonization  reached between banking and securities supervision. As shown in Table
7,  the  combined  index  of harmonization  between  banking  and  insurance  shows  a  degree  of
harmonization of 56 per cent,  as compared to an index of 73 per cent of harmonization  between
banking and securities.
Table 7. Harmonization Between  Banking and Insurance Supervision
as of Dec.  2001
Variables  Index
1.  Consolidated supervision  72%
2.  Off-site monitoring and analysis  69%
3.  On-site supervision  67%
4.  Licensing requirements  64%
5.  Accounting rules  50%
6.  Components of capital  42%
7.  Minimum capital adequacy  requirements  28%
Average  56%
Countries included: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Latvia, Malta, Norway,
Singapore, Sweden,  and the United Kingdom.
The  highest  degree of harmonization  between  banking  and insurance  has been  achieved  in the
core  areas  of supervision,  including  consolidated  supervision,  as  well  as  on-site  and  off-site
21  See EU Directive on Financial Conglomerates approved in 2002:
http://europa.eu.intlcomi/intemal_market/en/finances/fmanconglom/index.htm.
21supervision.  In each of these three  areas,  countries  reported an average  degree of integration  of
72  per  cent,  69  per  cent  and  67  per  cent,  respectively.  With  regards  to  the requirements  for
licensing and accounting rules, the average degrees of harmonization were 64 per cent and 50 per
cent,  respectively.  The  areas  in which  far  less integration  has been achieved  between  banking
and  insurance  supervision  include  the  definition  of  components  of  capital,  as  well  as  the
minimum  prudential  capital  requirements  that  intermediaries  must observe;  in these two  areas,
the degree of harmonization was just 42 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively.
On Site,  Off-Site  and Consolidated  Supervision
Most  of  the  countries  reported  a  high  level  of consistency  in  their  practices  for  on-site
supervision  of banks  and insurance  companies.  Even  those  countries that indicated  a degree of
harmonization  below the group's average,  such as Latvia and Malta,  have reported that they are
currently  working on achieving  a higher  degree  of consistency  for on-site  supervision  between
banks and insurance  companies.
Similarly, countries  reported  a relatively high  level of consistency in the off-site monitoring of
banks  and insurance  firms.  The average  index was  69 per cent. Although  only a few countries
have  launched  a comprehensive  supervisory framework  applicable to both banks and insurance
companies,  including  the  UK  and  Canada,  practically  all  countries  are  currently  improving
procedures for monitoring risk management effectiveness in banks and insurance  companies.
With  regard  to  consolidated  supervision,  most  countries  supervise  banks  and  insurance
companies  on both an  individual  and a consolidated  basis, if the intermediary  is affiliated with a
financial  group.  There  are,  however,  some  exceptions.  In  Australia,  Korea  and  Sweden,  for
instance, insurance companies  are only supervised on an unconsolidated basis.  Reportedly, these
countries are planning to move to consolidated  supervision for those institutions  in the future.22
Licensing
According  to  this  survey,  the  average  degree  of consistency  in  the  type  of  requirements  a
financial  institution  must  meet  to  operate  as  a  bank  or  an insurance  company  is  64 per  cent,
indicating only a moderate degree  of harmonization.  This is in part because the power to grant  a
license  is  not  always  in  the  hands  of  the  regulator,  but  lies  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance.
Interestingly,  in countries where licensing powers have been transferred to the regulators,  such as
in the United Kingdom, there is a high degree of harmonization of criteria.
Most countries  covered in this survey are making efforts to homogenize  the criteria for licensing
financial  institutions,  including  the minimum capital,  the technical  skills and moral integrity of
prospective  managers,  as  well  as  the  criteria  for  assessing  the viability  of the  business  plan.
Some  countries  have  accomplished  certain  degree  of consistency  in  the  licensing  process
through legislation where others are doing so through administrative procedures.
22  In  Korea,  for instance,  the FSS evaluates  the  solvency ratio  of insurance  companies on a consolidated
basis. Management evaluation  is not yet performed on a consolidated basis in Korea. The FSS is planning
to take supervisory actions against the insurance companies on a consolidated basis in the near future.
22Accounting  Rules
With regard to accounting rules, there  is  only modest harmonization of standards  that banks and
insurance  companies  have  to  follow.  Most  countries  report  important  differences  in  the
accounting  practices  applicable  to  both  types  of intermediaries.  Key differences  arise  in  the
valuation  of real  estate assets,  securities,  reserve  for  losses on assets,  and valuation of deposit-
like products.
In Sweden,  for instance,  insurance  companies  have the option to choose between fair value  and
historical cost as valuation principles  for real estate assets and securities, whereas banks may not
use fair values. With regard to reserve for losses  on assets, practices  also vary within  countries.
In Singapore (as well as in most countries), for instance, banks are required to classify loans and
investments  with principal  or interest payments  three  months  or more in  arrears  and set  aside
specific  provision  for such impaired assets.  In the case of insurance  companies,  there is  only a
general  provision  that  requires  insurers  to provision  for  doubtful  debts  and premiums  that are
past due, but the provisioning  levels  are not aligned between  banking and insurance  regulation.
Reportedly,  many countries are currently reviewing the reserve rules for insurers.
In  most  countries,  bodies  other  than  the  regulators  control  the  accounting  standards.
Accordingly,  the  pace  of harmonization  is  not  entirely  under  their  control,  although  they  do
influence  developments.  Many countries are working to  ensure that accounting standards  are  in
line  with  the  International  Accounting  Standards  of  the  International  Accounting  Standards
Committee (IASC).
As the lines  between the  activities  of traditional bank and insurance  firms become  less clear,  it
can be  foreseen that differences  in accounting  will have  to be dealt with.  Accounting  standards
harmonization  across industry  types  is,  therefore,  dependent  on  international  initiatives  in this
area.
Components  of Capital and Minimum Capital Adequacy Requirement
According to the results  of the survey,  countries  seem to have achieved only a modest  level of
consistency  with  regard  to  the  definition  of  regulatory  capital  for  banks  and  insurance
companies,  as well  as the minimum capital  requirements  that intermediaries  must comply with.
The average  degree  of harmonization  in these two areas was  only 42 per cent  and 28 per cent,
respectively.
In  the case of the  definition of regulatory  capital  for banks, practically  all countries  follow  the
risk-based  approach  contained  in  the  Basel  Capital Accord,  whereas  in  the case  of insurance
companies,  the  type  of components  of capital  that firms  need  to observe  for  capital  adequacy
purposes varies  from country to  country.  Besides  the traditional  concepts  of "core  capital",  the
capital  of insurance  companies  is also  composed  of several  elements  derived  from the type  of
particular  risks  faced by  insurance  firms,  such  as  the  "future risk reserve"  or the "catastrophe
reserve" in Japan or the "policy-holder dividends"  and "policy reserves"  in Korea.  Canada is the
23only country  in this group that reports a highly consistent definition of capital between banks and
insurance companies.
Currently,  most countries  are reassessing their definitions  of capital for both banks and insurance
firms  in  light  of recent  intemational  developments.  Some  countries,  e.g.  Singapore  and  the
United Kingdom,  are planning to move to a risk-based approach for insurance  companies  in the
future.  As part of the efforts  to achieve higher harmonization in this area, the United Kingdom is
planning to introduce a list of eligible capital items  in its new supervisory handbook from 2004,
while preserving some differences between banks and insurers.
With regard to the minimum capital  adequacy requirements  that banks and insurance  companies
have  to  observe,  less  harmonization  has  been  achieved  and,  apparently,  there  is  also  limited
scope for further harmonization in the future. As mentioned above,  all countries require banks  to
follow the BIS capital ratio.  In the case of insurers,  European countries follow the EU's solvency
margin  system.  Most countries  outside the  EU  area have  voluntarily  decided to  follow the EU
directive in this regard, thus making the appropriate  distinctions between  the individual types of
risk  specific  to  insurance  business  (e.g.  mortality  risk, morbidity  risk,  lapse  risk,  asset default
risk and  interest margin pricing  risk,  and catastrophe  risk for non-life insurance  firms,  among
others).  Although  most countries  indicated that they would be striving for more consistency  in
the  capital  adequacy  requirements  between  banking  and  insurance  firms,  consistency  will  be
clearly limited  by the  differences  in the underlying businesses  and by future developments  and
convergence of intemationally  accepted prudential standards  for banks and insurance companies.
3.3  Integration  of  Banking  and  Securities  Supervision  vs.  Banking  and  Insurance
Supervision
Chart 3 compares  the  degree of integration  between  banking  and securities  supervision  versus
banking and insurance  supervision by country.
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According to the results of this survey, countries that have adopted integrated supervision believe
they have achieved a higher degree of integration between banking and securities supervision (73
per cent on average) than between banking and insurance  supervision  (56 per cent on average).
Interestingly,  there  is practically no country in this survey that has  achieved  a higher degree  of
consistency  between  banking  and  insurance  supervision  than  between  banking  and  securities
supervision.
Does  it mean  it is easier  to  integrate  bank and  securities  supervision  than bank and  insurance
supervision?  This question,  unfortunately,  can  not be  answered  based upon  the  data  gathered
through this survey.  A study with a different  type of methodology  as well as a larger sample of
countries would be needed to provide a satisfactory answer to this question.
In any case,  the  survey did reveal  that despite the evident progress  made by some  countries  in
integrating regulatory approaches  in banking, securities  and insurance, most countries still have a
long way to go in terms of harmonizing regulations and supervisory practices. A major challenge
for countries  is how to evaluate the capital adequacy of financial conglomerates when the capital
tests are different for each sector. Similarly, authorities still face problems in assigning an overall
rating to a financial conglomerate where each sector is rated based on different factors.
One of the main risks of not unifying regulatory and supervisory processes  in integrated  agencies
is that former  specialized  agencies  will continue  to operate  separately,  each one applying their
own  approach  to  regulation  and  supervision,  and  with  limited  policy  coordination  among
themselves.  In  the  absence  of regulatory  and  supervisory  integration,  unified  agencies  may
become  a simple umbrella providing physical room for former agencies,  each  one continuing to
operate  in  its  own  way.  Failure  to  unify  the  supervisory  framework  applicable  to  financial
intermediaries may result in a false sense of comfort.  The risk is that governments may feel  that
supervisory  arbitrage  has  been minimized just by merging the pre-existent  supervisory agencies
when in reality no real change has taken place.
25In their efforts to achieve consistency amiong the regulatory and supervisory  approaches  to each
type of financial intermediary,  authorities need to take into account the fundamental  differences
between  business  activities.  In  many  cases,  consistency  may  not  be  appropriate.  Basic
institutional  differences  must be  recognized.  Finding  the right balance  between  consistency  of
regulatory  approaches  and  the  need  to  recognize  the  unique  characteristics  of each  type  of
financial  intermediary is perhaps  one of the biggest challenges  faced not only by countries that
have adopted integrated  supervision, but also by countries  that operate with multiple supervisors
that attempt to minimize regulatory arbitrage  by ensuring that similar risks are measured under
consistent  parameters  and methodologies,  regardless  of the  type of financial  intermediary  that
has undertaken them.
Finally,  it  is  important  to  mention  that  further  harmonization  of prudential  standards  across
segments  of  the  financial  system  will  largely  depend  on  the  convergence  of  international
standards  for banks, securities  companies and insurers, since most countries prefer to adjust their
regulation and supervision to internationally accepted standards.
In 2001,  the "Joint Forum," a working group including representatives  from banking,  securities,
and insurance  supervisors,  issued a report  comparing the Core Principles for the supervision of
banks,  insurers  and  securities  firms  issued  by their  respective  standard  setting  bodies  (Basle
Committee  on  Bank  Supervision,  International  Organization  of Securities  Commissions,  and
International  Association  of Insurance  Supervisors).23 Although  the  report  did  not  find  any
significant  contradictions  between  the  three  sets  of  Core  Principles,  it  identified  several
divergences in key areas, such as the definition of regulatory capital, the requirements  for capital,
and the  definition  and  treatment  of various  types of risks.  Certainly,  more  work  is needed  to
identify  the  areas  in which  consistency  of regulatory  and supervisory  practices  across  sectors
could and should be achieved.
At this stage, the absence of harmonized prudential standards in several areas  at the international
level  may  become  an obstacle  to  further harmonization  of financial  sector rules  in  individual
countries.
IV Complexity of Integrating Supervisory Agencies
This  section  discusses  some  of the  practical  problems  faced  by  policy-makers  in  unifying
different supervisory  agencies,  and draws  some lessons  from the data that may be valuable  for
countries planning to adopt integrated  supervision.  The agencies  that participated  in this survey
identified  some important obstacles that they faced during the phase of transition from multiple
supervisors  to  a  single  (or partially)  unified supervisor,  sharing some of the important  lessons
they have learned in adopting integrated  supervision.
23  For a comparison of international  standards for the supervision of bank, securities  and insurance firms,
see:  BIS  (2001):  Core  Principles:  Cross  Sectoral  Comrparison.  The  Joint  Forum.  November  2001.
Available  at: http://www.bis.org/publ/joint03.pdf
26Table 8. Problems in Establishing Integrated Supervisory Agencies
N of agencies  As  % of total
Problem  affected  agencies
1.  Legal constraints  (need to amend a number of pieces
of financial sector legislation).  10  67%
2.  Departure of experienced personnel.  9  60%
3.  Delays  in integration of IT systems and infrastructure
of merged agencies  8  53%
4.  Demoralization  of staff of the merged entities.  8  53%
5.  Lack of mission and clarity in the newly merged
institution.  2  13%
6.  Budgetary problems (insufficient  funds to complete
the integration of agencies).  2  13%
Countries included:  Australia,  Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg,  Malta, Mexico,
Norway, Singapore,  Sweden and the United Kingdom.
As shown in Table 8,  countries have  faced several types of obstacles as they moved to complete
the adoption of an integrated supervisory  system.  Some of these have included legal constraints
and the need for new laws to be enacted,  departure of experienced personnel,  demoralization  of
staff, and problems  and delays  in the integration of IT systems  and other infrastructure  systems
of the merged  entities.  Reportedly,  in  a few countries  integrated agencies  have faced  a lack of
mission and clarity during  their early  years of existence  as  well as  serious budgetary problems
affecting their ability  to operate properly.
4.1 Legal Constraints
In most countries,  the establishment of a unified supervisory agency has required the review and
amendment of a large number of financial sector laws  and regulations  to enable the new entity to
fulfill its  functions effectively  across the financial  system.  In fact, it is not surprising  that some
countries  (such as the  United Kingdom)  have gone beyond  the amendment  of existing  laws by
replacing a number of sector-specific  laws with a single piece of new legislation.24
The law needs to define the mission, objectives, powers  and scope of responsibilities of the new
unified agency.  Moreover,  in  accordance  with best international  practices  (as  defined in  Core
Principles  for Bank,  Securities  and Insurance  Supervision,  respectively),  it should also  provide
for autonomy  and legal protection for the staff of the new entity for decisions and actions made
in good faith, and establish the mechanisms  to ensure proper accountability of the new entity.
However,  as  shown  in  Table  8, nine  out  of 14  agencies  covered in  this  section  of the survey
reported  experiencing  problems  associated  with  an outdated  or  inadequate  legal  framework  at
least  during  the  first three  years  of existence.  Some  of the  problems  faced  by these  agencies
included  legal ambiguity with regard to their sources of funding,  ownership  of assets, power to
endorse  treaties  with  foreign  counterparts,  power  to  impose  sanctions  against  market
participants,  and  the power  to  issue  and  amend  prudential  regulations.  In  addition,  in  a  few
countries the staff of the unified agencies were not legally protected  and the existing laws did not
specify the mechanisms  to ensure proper accountability of these agencies.
24 We are referring to the Financial  Services and Markets Act, which was passed by the UK Parliament in
June 2000 and came into force on 1.  Dec., 2001.
27These  types of legal problems affected  the capability of agencies  to  fulfill their responsibilities
properly at  least during their  first years of operation.  In this  sense,  it is important that laws be
updated  before  or shortly  after the  new agency  has  been established  to  avoid  weaknesses  that
may undermine the effectiveness  and credibility of the new institution.
4.2 Departure of Experienced  Personnel and Demoralization  of Staff
An unintended  consequence  of the  unification  of supervisory  agencies  has been the  voluntary
departure of experienced personnel  of the merging institutions.  Nine out of 14 agencies analyzed
in  this  section  of the  survey  reported  the  departure  of valuable  personnel  as  a  result  of the
uncertainty created by the merging process.
Another related problem  has been  the demoralization  of the  staff of the merged entities  during
and after the unification process. Fifty per cent of the agencies analyzed in this survey have been
affected by this type of problem.  Many staff viewed the unification process with uncertainty not
just  because  of the  possible  redundancies,  but also  because  of the  delays  in  configuring  the
definitive  structure  of  the  unified  institution,  appointing  or  ratifying  the  new  heads  of the
departments  and setting the overall conditions of employment.25
4.3 Managerial Issues
The  process  of merging  two  or  more  supervisory  agencies  is  a  major  managerial  challenge,
because  each  of the  agencies  has  its  own  identity  and  in  most  cases  - a  well-established
organizational  structure  and  corporate  culture.  Moreover,  each  of the  agencies  has  its  own
approach  to  regulation  and  supervision,  and  operates  with  its  own  tools  and  procedures  in
monitoring  a particular  type  of financial  intermediary  and ensuring  compliance  with laws  and
regulations.
The management  challenge of merging  a number of different regulatory  agencies  should not be
underestimated.  If the unification  process  is  not managed  appropriately,  there  is the risk that it
can  go  off  track.  Besides  the  problems  related  to  loss  of  experienced  personnel  and
demoralization  of staff mentioned  above,  several  agencies  reported additional problems.  These
related  to  difficulty  in  developing  a  comprehensive  plan  to  conduct  the  merger,  integrate  IT
systems and other essential  infrastructure elements of the merged entities.  There were  also some
problems  in  attaining  the  economies  of  scale  by  downsizing  the  number  departments  and
personnel  of the  merging  institutions,  even  when  there  was  a clear  duplication  of functions.
Moreover,  as  indicated  in  the  Table  8,  two  agencies  covered  in the  survey  faced  budgetary
constraints, as well as various problems in defining their:
25  Reportedly,  the agencies that have completed the transition phase from multiple to a single supervisor,
such  as the FSA  in the UK,  have become  much more  attractive employers  than the former regulators,  so
recruitment  has  been  easier.  See,  Clive  Briault  (2001):  Building  a  Single  Financial  Regulator.  Paper
prepared  for the Conference  on "Challenges  for Unified Financial  Supervision",  2-3  July 2001,  Tallinn,
Estonia.
28*  mission and overall objectives;
*  business plan and work program;
*  new organizational structure with clear responsibilities for each unit; and
*  responsibilities  of senior staff.
When a country decides to adopt integrated  supervision,  it should define what exactly it is trying
to achieve and how. As this paper has shown,  an integrated  supervisory agency can take different
forms.  Authorities  may  want  to  adopt  either  a  partial  scheme  of integrated  supervision  (by
merging only two  of the main agencies)  or a full  one (by merging  all supervisory  agencies  and
creating  a single supervisor  for the financial system). Moreover,  authorities  may want to grant to
the new agency either a full or only a limited set of powers to regulate and supervise the financial
system, keeping important  powers,  such as  license  authorization  /  revocation,  at the ministry of
finance,  central bank or other agencies.
Another important consideration  is how far a country plans to go in harmonizing  regulatory  and
supervisory  practices  across  intermediaries.  On  the  one  hand,  the  new  integrated  agency  may
want  to  have  its  main  departments  organized  on  the  basis  of functional  regulation,  each
department  devoted to  specific  functions  across  all  intermediaries.  On  the  other hand,  the new
agency may want to organize its departments  according to the type of financial  intermediaries  it
supervises.
One of the most difficult tasks of unifying regulatory agencies  is to strike  an appropriate  balance
between  the different objectives  of regulation.  Given the diversity of these objectives  -- ranging
from preventing  systemic risk to protecting the  individual  consumer from fraud  --  it is possible
that a single regulator might not have a clear focus on the objectives and rationale for regulation,
and  might  not  be  able  to  adequately  differentiate  between  different  types  of  institutions.
Moreover,  a poor definition of the objectives  of the new  entity may provide  little guidance  for
the regulator when its different objectives  come into conflict.
Table 9 compares  the average  timeframe required  by this group of countries to complete certain
activities  related to the merger of their supervisory  agencies.  The time is counted  from the time
the decision to merge the entities was announced.




1.  Set the definitive organizational  structure of the new merged entity.  2.0
2.  Set in the legal  framework the scope of legal powers, responsibilities
and goals of the new regulatory agency.  1.5
3.  Set the strategic (business) plan of the new entity describing its
objectives, strategies and actions needed to achieve them.  1.2
4.  Integrate the IT systems of the merged entities.  1.1
5.  Reallocate personnel and define new roles.  0.9
6.  Integrate budgetary processes.  0.8
7.  Appoint (confirm) the heads of the new departments of the merged
entity.  0.7
Countries included:  Australia, Canada, Demnark, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Latvia, Malta, Mexico, Norway,
Sweden,  and United Kingdom.
Clearly,  the completion  of this  set of key activities  required  to facilitate  the merger  of two  or
more  institutions  has  taken  on  average  between  one  and  two  years.  Countries  agreed  that,
whenever possible, these types of activities should be carried out rapidly to minimize uncertainty
of staff of the merging entities and disillusionment with regard to the integration process.
Moreover,  where  the  establishment  of a  single  integrated  agency  is  one  of several  steps  to
improve  the overall quality  of financial  sector  supervision of a country,  it is important that the
merger  process  occurs  rapidly  so  that  it  can  generate  the  necessary  "reform  culture"  and
facilitates the rapid implementation  of further reforms in the financial  sector.
4.4 Other Issues
Countries  pointed  out  that  an  important  risk  of establishing  integrated  agencies  is  that  one
approach  of supervision may prevail over the other types.  This may happen when one particular
type of financial  intermediary  - usually commercial  banks  - dominates  the  financial  sector.
This type of problem is likely to arise when one of the merging agencies - normally the banking
supervisor  --  has  a disproportionate  number  of staff,  resources  and facilities,  as compared  with
the other supervisors,  making the merger process  appear to be a "takeover"  of small supervisory
agencies by a large  entity rather than a process  of integration between two or more supervisory
agencies.
If not  properly  managed,  this type  of situation may  result  in  rapid  setbacks  in  the  quality  of
supervision  of the  non-bank  financial  intermediaries  in  a  country,  since  the  new  integrated
agency may focus its resources  in the most important type of intermediary,  usually banks,  at the
expense of the others.
In  addition,  several  agencies  emphasized  the  importance  of communicating  to  the  market  the
objectives,  policies and tools of the new institution.  An important element for the success of the
integrated  agency  is that all  market participants  understand  the rationale  for  creating  a unified
supervisor and are willing to cooperate with it in maintaining financial  sector stability. Countries
also  emphasized  the  importance  of establishing  a clear framework that delineates  the roles  and
30responsibilities  of the  unified  supervisor,  the  ministry of finance  and  the  central  bank,  so that
market  participants  understand  the  scope  of responsibilities  and  accountability  of the  new
supervisor.
Another  important  issue  is  that  the  integration  of supervisory  agencies  preferably  should  be
undertaken when the financial  system is stable,  allowing management  more scope to adequately
address  the  many  complex  issues  associated  with  organizational  change.  Trying  to  make
organizational  changes  at  a time  when  the  financial  sector  is also  experiencing  difficulty  (and
management  time  needs  to  be  directed  to  the  basic  supervisory  tasks)  should  be  avoided  if
possible.
V Conclusions
This  paper  summarizes  the  results  of a  survey  carried  out  in  a  group  of  15  developed  and
developing  countries that have decided  to merge some of or all of their  agencies responsible  for
supervising  banks,  securities  finns,  insurance  companies,  and  other  types  of  financial
intermediaries.  The  survey  analyzed  the  reasons  for  adopting  integrated  supervision  in  these
countries  and examined  some  of the key characteristics  of these  agencies.  It  also  assessed  the
progress of these agencies in adopting a consistent framework  of regulation and supervision for
all  financial intermediaries  they oversee.  In addition,  the survey identified some of the practical
problems that countries have faced in establishing a unified supervisory agency.
The survey  led to  five interesting  findings.  First,  the need to supervise  financial  conglomerates
effectively  and on  a consistent basis,  along with the need  to maximize economies  of scale  and
scope, appeared as the two key reasons for adopting integrated supervision in most countries.
Second,  a careful  analysis of the  regulatory and  supervisory  powers  of the integrated  agencies
revealed that this group of agencies  is not as homogeneous  as it seems.  On the one hand, there is
a  group  of mega-supervisors  with wide  regulatory  and  supervisory powers  over practically  all
intermediaries.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  second  group  of single  supervisors  with  limited
regulatory powers over the intermediaries they oversee.  Finally, there is a third group of partially
unified agencies that only supervise 2 of the 3 main sectors  in the financial system.
The  survey  also  revealed  that  in  many  countries,  the  ministries  of finance  and  central  banks
continue playing  a key role in issuing and amending relevant prudential regulations,  authorizing
or revoking  licenses  to financial  intermediaries,  and setting other important  rules for the  entire
financial system.
Third,  according to the survey only few countries have been able to design a single supervisory
framework  to  harmonize  regulations  and  supervisory  approaches  across  the  entire  financial
system.  In  most  countries,  progress  towards  the  harmonization  of prudential  regulation  and
supervision  across  their  intermediaries  remains  limited.  On  the  one  hand,  most  of the  new
integrated  agencies  are  relatively  new  institutions  which  did  not participate  in  the  design  of
existing legislation.  They will require more time to  harmonize their regulatory  and supervisory
standards.  On the other hand,  the lack of harmonized  regulatory  standards  for banks,  insurance
31companies  and  securities  intermediaries  at  an  international  levels  makes  the  development  of
harmonized  standards  at a national level  more difficult to accomplish,  since countries  prefer to
follow internationally  recognized standards.
One  of the main  risks  of not  unifying  regulatory  and  supervisory  processes  in  the  integrated
agencies  is  that  former  specialized  agencies  will  continue  to  operate  separately,  each  one
applying  their  own  approach  to  regulation  and  supervision.  In  the  absence  of regulatory  and
supervisory  integration,  unified  agencies  may  become  a  simple  umbrella  providing  physical
room  for former  agencies, preserving different  approaches  to supervision  and providing  a false
feeling that real change has taken place.
Fourth, in the countries  covered in this survey there seems to be  a higher  degree of integration
(consistency)  in the  regulation  and supervision  of banks and securities companies  than between
banks and insurance firms.
Finally, most countries have confronted practical  problems in the establishment  and operation of
their  unified  supervisory  agencies.  Problems  have  included,  among  others,  departure  of
experienced  personnel,  inappropriate  legal  systems,  and  lack  of focus  of the  new  integrated
agency.  These problems reflect the complexity of the practical issues involved in the adoption of
integrated supervision.  The management  challenge  of merging  a number of different regulatory
agencies  should not be underestimated.  If the unification process  is not managed  appropriately,
there  is  the  risk  is that  it can  go  off track.  Moreover,  where  one  of the  merging  agencies  -
normally  the  banking  supervisor  --  has  a  disproportionate  number  of  staff,  resources  and
facilities, as compared with the other supervisors, there is the risk that the approach to regulation
and supervision of the dominant agency prevails over the others.
Integrated  supervision  is still a recent phenomena and its effectiveness  has not been proven yet.
In  fact,  all  unified  supervisory  agencies  covered  in  this  survey  are  still  in  the  process  of
formulating and testing their new tools to supervise their financial  sectors.  Countries considering
integrated supervision  should carefully assess the pros and cons  of it in a broad context,  taking
into account the size,  structure  and stage of development  of their financial systems.  Making the
decision  to  move  to  an  integrated  agency  is  just  the  beginning  of  the  process.  The
implementation  is the most difficult part  of it.  This survey revealed  that, whatever  the form an
integrated  supervisory  agency  takes  (mega-supervisor  versus  partially  unified  agency),  a
comprehensive  plan  and  strong managerial  skills will be needed to make integrated  supervision
work.
The  lessons  learned  from  countries  that  have  adopted  integrated  supervision  may  also  be
valuable  for  countries  that  decide  to  keep  their  system  of multiple  agencies  supervising  the
financial  system. Many of the issues faced by integrated supervisors must also be faced by non-
integrated  supervisors  that  wish  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of supervision.  For  instance,
countries  with  multiple  supervisory  agencies  must  also  deal  with  the  challenges  posed  by
financial  conglomerates.  Also,  they  must  decide  on  the  optimal  degree  of harmonization  of
regulatory  and  supervisory practices  in order to minimize  regulatory arbitrage.  Moreover,  they
must ensure that the different types of supervisors communicate and coordinate appropriately.
32In a model of integrated supervision, these issues have to be dealt with immediately,  whereas  in
countries with multiple supervisors  these  issues do not necessarily  require  immediate  attention.
Nonetheless, if a country wishes to strengthen the overall quality of regulation and supervision in
the financial sector, these are important issues that need to be addressed sooner or later.
Possible Areas for  Future Research
As this survey has shown, integrated supervision is a topic that requires much more research.  An
important  issue  to  examine  is whether,  and  under what conditions,  the  adoption  of integrated
supervision improves the overall effectiveness  of prudential supervision. Has the effectiveness  of
prudential  supervision  improved  more  rapidly in  countries  that adopted  integrated  supervision
than  in other countries?  If so, why?  Are  certain  types  of integrated  supervisory  agencies more
effective  than  others  (single  regulators  vs. partially-integrated  agencies)?  Are  agencies  with  a
broad  set  of regulatory  and  supervisory  powers  more  effective  than  agencies  with  limited
powers? Are autonomous agencies more effective than agencies with no autonomy?
Another  important  area for future  research  is which  types of countries  may benefit  most from
integrated  supervision.  Is  integrated  supervision  only appropriate  for  countries  with developed
and sophisticated financial  systems or is it equally appropriate  for all countries  regardless of the
size  and  stage  of development  of their  financial  systems?  Is  a single  regulator  and supervisor
.always  adequate  for  small  economies  or are  there  circumstances  in  which  separate  regulators
may be more appropriate for those countries?
It  would  also  be  important  to  examine  how  the  benefits  of integrated  supervision  can  be
maximized.  Should  laws  and  regulations  be  re-drafted  to  allow  a  functional  rather  than
institutional-type  of supervision?  How  should  the  departments  within  a  single  regulator  be
organized?  Is  there  a  particular  structure  that  tends  to  maximize  the  benefits  of  integrated
supervision? What are the  most appropriate mechanisms  to make unified agencies accountable?
Finally,  it would be useful  to explore  to what extent  integrated  agencies  are  better prepared  to
handle the failure of financial conglomerates,  or widespread financial sector crises, than separate
supervisory  agencies?  And,  if so,  why?  Are  single  supervisory  agencies  better  prepared  to
facilitate financial  innovation and overall financial  sector development than separate  supervisory
agencies?
As  more  and  more  countries  intensify  their  efforts  to  strengthen  their  financial  sector
supervision, the aforementioned  questions  are becoming more relevant.  Certainly, more research
on  these  topics  can  provide  useful  guidance  to  policy-makers  to  find  the  most  appropriate
institutional arrangements  to regulate and supervise their financial systems.
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35Annex  1-Questionnaire
1.  Type of financial system and its stage of development
1.1 Please provide the following information on your financial  system, both for the year in which
the integration of supervisory agencies was decided (indicating the year) as well as the end of the
year 2001  or 2000.
1990(l)  End of 2001 (if  Comments
Data  possible)  or end
._________________________________________________________  of2000
Total assets of private financial intermediaries  (as a % of
GDP).
Total assets of private commercial banks (as a % of total assets
of all financial institutions operating in your country)
Total assets of other type of intermediaries (as % of total
assets  of  private financial institutions operating in  your
country
Financial Conglomerates
Total number of commercial banks
Total number of financial conglomerates  ,
Cottvercial banks that are part of or controlled by a domestic
financial conglomerate
Commercial banks that are part of or controlled by a  foreign
financial conglomerate
Total assets of commercial banks that are owned or controlled
by a (domestic or foreign) financial conglomerate, as % of
total assets of private commercial banks in  your country.
Total assets of securities  companies that are owned  or
controlled by a  (domestic or foreign) financial conglomerate,
as % of total assets of securities companies  in your country.
Assets of insurance companies that are owned or controlled by
a financial conglomerate,  as % of total assets of insurance
companies in your country.
(1) If information of this year is not available, please provide information  on the earliest year you have information.
*The concept of financial conglomerate  is broad and includes (i)  a company, restricted to the financial services industry, that
owns and / or controls  a bank or other financial  services firm, or (ii) a financial  institution, ie a bank, or other bank or entity
that owns and / or controls  other financial institutions (usually  as subsidiaries).
**Securities  companies  refer to  all type of financial  intermediaries  in the  securities  industry,  including but not limited  to
investment banks, brokerage companies, and fand management firms.
1.2 Are there commercial banks owned or controlled by commercial conglomerates?  How many?
1.3  (Based  on  Figure  A  below),  please  indicate  the  type(s)  (A,  B,  C  or  D)  of financial
conglomerate that are allowed to operate in your country:
1.4 (Based on Figure A below), please indicate the predominant type (A,B,C,  or D) of financial
conglomerate operating in your country:
36TYPE A:  FULL INTEGRATION
Universal Bank
Bank, Securities, Insurance and Other Financial
Activities
TYPE B: PARTIAL INTEGRATION
Universal Bank
Banking Activities and Securities Activities
1~
Insurance Activities  Other Activities  Other Activities
Subsidiary  Subsidiary  Subsidiary
TYPE C: PARTIAL INTEGRATION
Universal Bank
Banking Activities
Securities Activities  Insurance Activities  Other Financial
Activities
Subsidiary  Subsidiary  Subsidiary
TYPE D: HOLDING COMPANY  STRUCTURE
Holding Company
Banking Activities  Securities  Activities  Insurance  Activities
Subsidiary  Subsidiary  Subsidiary
2.  Purpose of Unification
2.1  What were the main reasons for the unification of regulatory bodies in your country?  Please
indicate whether the following factors constituted a reason for unifying regulatory agencies in
your country.
37_  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ___  Y  es  N  o
1.  Poor coordination and communication  among existing supervisory bodies.
2.  Unregulated  areas or non-supervised business activities due to fragmentation of supervisory
functions.
3.  Weaknesses  in the  financial  sector  due to poor regulation  and supervision  of the financial
industry
4.  Need to restructure all supervisory institutions (especially after a major financial crisis)
5.  Need to maximize economies of scale and scope
6.  Evolution of the financial system towards  a more universal  type system in which banks and
other intermediaries become more integrated.  .
7.  Other (please describe)
2.2 Before the unification of regulatory agencies  was made, what type of arrangements were in
place to coordinate  the actions of the different regulatory agencies?
(a)  Formal inter-agency committees that meet regularly to discuss common issues
(b)  Informal committees that meet from time to time to discuss common issues
2.3 Did the above type of committees work adequately?  If not, why not.
3.  Type of unification and characteristics of the new supervisory entity
3.1 Please indicate the type of integration of supervisory bodies carried out in  your country:
a.  Unification of banking, securities, and insurance regulator
b.  Unification of banking and securities supervisors
c.  Unification of banking and insurance supervisor
d.  Unification of banking and other supervisor
3.2 Please indicate (with yes or no) if the new unified entity has the following regulatory  and
supervisory powers in  each of the market segments  it oversees.
38Bankdng  Securities  Insurance  Other  Comments
intermediaries
1.  Set licensing requirements
2.  Approve license to  a financial
intermediary
3.  Revoke license to a financial
intermediary
4.  Set accounting rules and information
disclosure requirements
5.  Set rules on the composition of capital
6.  Set minimum capital requirements
7.  Set prudential  regulations on market,
credit,  operational  and liquidity risks
8.  Conduct on-site examinations
9.  Conduct off-site examinations and
surveillance
10.  Impose sanctions and fines for non-
compliance with rules and regulations
11.  Consumer protection (assist to resolve
claims for abuses against users of
financial services)
12.  h. Other (please describe)
3.3 Do you consider that your institution should have any additional powers (prerogatives) to
regulate and supervise financial  intermediaries to fulfill its mafndate adequately?
(a)  Yes, which?
(b) No
3.4 Are there any plan to strengthen the powers of the new supervisory entity?
(c)  Yes, which?
(d)  No
3.5 Are there any type of intermediaries not regulated and supervised by the new entity? Which?
Are there any plans to expand the supervisory scope of your institutions to this other type of
intermediaries  in the future?
3.6 Has the new unified supervisory entity been granted budgetary autonomy?
(a)  Yes, it has its own funding sources (which are independent  from political decisions).
(b) No
3.7 Are the staff of the entity legally protected to carry out their duties in good faith?
(a)  Yes
(b) No
3.8 Does the laws require the head of the regulatory  agency to be someone with several years of
experience  in the financial sector as well as good reputation in the financial industry?
(a)  yes
(b) no
393.9 Can the head and members of the governing body of the main regulatory  agency be removed
by the Ministry of Finance, the Governor of the Central Bank or any other government official  at
any time?
(a)  Yes
(b)  No, the removal of the  above officials  is only possible through  extraordinary procedures
and causes established in the law.
Process of unification
4.1.  When was the decision to unify regulatory agencies made? Please indicate year.
4.2.  Who made the decision?
4.3.  Were  amendments  to  financial  sector  legislation  required  to  merge  the  existing
supervisory  agencies or create a new one?
(a)  Yes
(b) No
4.4.  Since  the  agencies  were  merged,  please  indicate  progress  so  far  in  homogenizing
regulatory  and supervisory processes  across different type of intermediaries.  Assign a score from
1 to  4  (l=none  at  all,  2=to  some  degree,  3=to  a significant  degree,  4=being  complete)  to  the
degree of unification that has been achieved so far.
DEGREE OF INTEGRATION OF REGULATORY  AND  SUPERVISORY  PROCESSES
1.  Same requirements  for licensing
2.  Consolidated supervision
3.  Accounting  rules  in areas such as:
*  Valuation of real estate assets  L
*  Valuation of securities
*  Reserving for losses on assets
*  Valuation of "deposif' like
products
4.  Similar components of capital
5.  Similar minimum capital  adequacy
requirements  .
6.  Assessment of risk management
effectiveness  in such areas as:
*  credit risk
*  market risk
*  operational risk
*  liquidity risk
7.  Off-site monitoring and analysis
Rates:  I=none at all, 2=to some degree,  3=to a significant degree, 4=being complete
4.5 Please describe how the supervision of financial activities is done by the new merged entity?
(a)  supervision is mainly done by type of intermediary
(b)  supervision is mainly done by type of product (functional supervision),  regardless of the
type of intermediary carrying out a certain business activity
40(c)  a combination of both approaches
4.6 Do you have plans to adopt a more "functional"  approach to financial supervision?
(a)  Yes, please describe planned activities to achieve this goal.
(b)  No
4.7 Please indicate how long it took your organization to accomplish the following goals, based
on the date the merger of supervisory agencies was announced.
Objective  No. of  Comments
months
1.  Set in the legal framework the scope of legal powers, responsibilities
and goals of the new regulatory  agency
2.  Set the definitive organizational  structure of the new merged entity
3.  Appoint (confirm) the heads of the new departments  of the merged
entity
4.  Set the strategic (business) plan of the new entity describing its
objectives,  strategies and actions needed to achieve them
5.  Re-allocate personnel and define new roles
6.  Integrate the IT systems of the merged entities
7.  Integrate budgetary processes
5.  Assessing  unification
5.1  Has the quality of supervision improved thanks to the unification of regulatory agencies?
(a)  Yes, it has improved rapidly.
(b) Yes, but it has improved slowly.
(c)  No
5.2 How long will it take to complete the integration of the unified supervisory agency?
(a)  less than 6 months
(b) between 6 and 12 months
(c)  between  1 and 2 years
(d) between 2 and 4 years
(e)  more than 4 years
5.3 Do you carry out consolidated supervision of financial intermediaries?
(a)  Yes
(b) No. Are you planning to do it? What steps are needed to implement it?
6.  Problems in Unification
6.1 Please indicate whether policy- makers have faced any of the following problems to integrate
the supervisory entities.
41No  Yes, to a  Yes, to a
small  significant
.degree  degree
1.  Legal constraints  (need to amend a number of financial sector legislations).
2.  Budgetary problems (insufficient funds to complete the integration of agencies).
3.  Demoralization of staff of the merged entities.
4.  Lack of mission and clarity and the new merged institution.
5.  Departure of experienced personnel.
6.  Delays to integrate IT systems and infrastructure  of merged agencies
7.  Other (please describe).
6.2 During the process of supervisory integration,  has one type of the existing supervisors tended
to  dominate the others (eg banking supervision dominate the others)?
(a)  Yes, please provide comments on how you have addressed this issue.
(b) No
6.3 Do you think that the regulation and supervision of one intermediary (e.g. securities or
insurance) has received less attention than what it deserves due to the integration  of supervisory
approaches  within a single agency?
(a)  Yes, how have you resolved the problem?
(b)  No
6.4 Has integrating regulation  and supervision  across different financial intermediaries proven
more difficult and lengthy than initially foreseen?
(a)  Yes, please provide comments
(b) No
7. Lessons  for other countries
7.1  Please draw some lessons from the process of supervisory unification in your country that
you may want to share with financial authorities of other countries planning to unify their
supervisory agencies. You may want to provide comments  on the following areas:
*  Key issues before deciding the merger of supervisory entities.
*  Rapid versus  slow approaches for integrating supervisory agencies
*  Minimum elements of a strategic plan to merge supervisory agencies
*  Management issues (motivating  staff for change)
*  Establishing a new organizational  culture
*  Approaches for integrating supervision of different intermediaries
*  Other
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Market Share of Financial Conglomerates in the Bank, Securities
and Insurance Sectors in Selected  Countries (1990* vs. 2001)
Banking  Securities  Insurance
1990*  2001  1990*  2001  1990*  2001
Australia  98.000/  98.00%  n.a.  n.a.  96.900/  97.60%
Canada  8.000/  5.00%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Denmark  73.00%  79.000/  99.000/  61.000/  62.00%.  66.000/
Estonia  97.30/  97.50%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  27.00%
Hungary  50.300/  96.90%  68.200/  94.00%  78.600/  90.500/
Iceland  n.a.  na  48.300/  44.30/  n.a.  n.a.
Korea  n.a.  99.100/  n.a.  92.50%  n.a.  78.90%,
Latvia  19.500/  41.90%,  n.a.  35.30/  17.90%  45.30%
Luxembourg  n.a.  17.90%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Malta  0.00%  32.000/  83.00%  57.000/  8.000  33.00%
Mexico  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Norway  3.00%  70.000/  0.000/;  72.00%  0.000/  69.000/
Singapore  99.000/  99.000/  76.000/  81.000/  62.00%  58.000/
Sweden  78.000/  89.00%  7.000  31.000/  2.000/  22.000/
UK  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
AVEERAGE**  52.61%  70.83%,  54.50%  62.90%1  40.93%1  70.18%1
*or earliest available  date. For Australia the earliest available year was 1999, for Canada  1995,  for Estonia 2000, for
Hungary  1993,  for Korea  1997, for Latvia 1998,  for Luxembourg  1994, for Malta 1994, Singapore 2000, Sweden
1993.  For all other countries,  the information used was from year 1990.
** The figure was calculated using only information from countries that reported  information on both years.
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Countries that Have Adopted Integrated Supervision
Size  and Composition of Their Financial Systems
Composition of the financial system
Assets  of all private  (Banks  vs.  NBFIs)
Country  intermediaries (as  Assets of banks (as %  Assets of NBFIs (as
%  of GDP)  of assets of all  % of assets of all
intermediaries)  intermediaries)
1.  Australia  501.00%  73.00%  23.00%
2.  Canada  190.00%  75.00%  25.00%
3.  Denmark  394.00%  38.00%  62.00%
4.  Estonia  91.29%  77.60%  22.40%
5.  Hungary  81.80%  66.40%  33.60%
6.  Iceland  101.90%  24.40%  49.70%
7.  Korea  181.60%  50.80%  49.20%
8.  Latvia  71.80%  96.00%  4.00%
9.  Luxembourg  3221.30%  94.90%  5.10%
10.  Malta  383.00%  97.00%  3.00%
11.  Mexico  36.07%  76.11%  23.9%
12.  Norway  144.00%  35.00%  65.00%
13.  Singapore  827.00%  95.00%  5.00%
14.  Sweden  219.00%  63.00%  37.00%
15.  UK  630.00%  54.00%  46.00%
Average  471.58%  67.75%  30.26%
Average  (without
Luxembourg)  264.92%  52.09%  31.49%
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